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Abstract. Network security systems are designed to identify and, if possible, 
prevent unauthorized access to computer and network resources. Today most 
network security systems consist of hardware and software components that work 
in conjunction with one another to present a layered line of defense against 
unauthorized intrusions. Software provides user interactive layers such as 
password authentication, and system level layers for monitoring network activity. 
This paper examines an application monitoring network traffic that attempts to 
identify Indicators of Compromise (IOC) by extracting patterns in the network 
traffic which likely corresponds to unauthorized access. Typical network log data 
and construct indicators are analyzed to predict network intrusion. Based on these 
indicators, a fitted model was created demonstrating which indicators best predict 
an intrusion event. In the end we found that XGBoost provided the best accuracy 
and f-score for our model fit. The IOCs that best predicted an intrusion event 
were associated with newly recorded events, network traffic, and DNS events. 
1   Introduction 
Cybersecurity is a major focus for companies due to an increasing number of attacks 
targeting their data and computer systems. Cybersecurity is the field that is focused on 
securing information systems and the data that resides on them. Data is quickly 
becoming the most vital resource to companies, making it an attractive target for 
cybercriminals. Many recent high-profile attacks attempt to exfiltrate sensitive 
information, as in the case with the OPM data breach in 2015 or attempt to make data 
unavailable as in the case of the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017. Although 
many tools are available to cybersecurity and IT professionals to identify or prevent 
these attacks, implementation and maintenance of these tools require companies to 
invest in large teams to manage the applications or require specialized expertise that 
may be cost-prohibitive for small companies. Our goal was to use the standard logs 
typically generated by IT environments to reduce the amount of time needed in 
identifying unauthorized access and minimize any damage done by an attack. 
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Our approach to finding indicators of compromise (IOC) is by either abstraction of 
audit data or applying classification techniques to the aggregated audit data to create 
models that detect positive attack patterns. We created easily understood indicators for 
cybersecurity analysts to investigate possible attacks or provide enough insight for 
investigators to know where to further investigate any possible attacks. We can make 
security professionals more effective by providing tools that add insight using the 
systems that are already at their disposal while reducing the effort needed to gain this 
understanding. Effective means of intrusion detection involves abstracting known 
malicious material into indicators of compromise. Indicators of compromise are cyber 
events that strongly indicate a possible attack on a computer or a network. IOCs alert 
security administrators or auditors to investigate security events, but if the rules 
configured for identifying IOCs are set incorrectly then intrusions can be missed, or the 
security team can receive false positives alerts. Several factors are considered when 
gauging if an IOC is a true positive. These factors include multiple IOCs occurring in 
a short period, the IOC is associated with high-value equipment, or an event registered 
as a critical IOC.   
The idea of an IOC would make it seem there is a common signature for computer 
network intrusions, but as seen by the significant delays in detecting network intrusions, 
this assumption is wrong. From research done by IBM, the mean time to identify 
breaches was 197 days, with 69 days being the mean time to contain.1 This delay in 
detection could be attributed to many factors including lack of evidence or poor 
staffing. A breach can be attributed to improper system configuration or an attack by a 
cybercriminal. Breaches due to improper configuration are all too common, sometimes 
with significant repercussions as in the case of the breach of 123 million records from 
Alteryx in 2017,2 unclassified intelligence data found in 2017,3 or top-secret data from 
the United States Department of Defense found in 2017.4 The attacks associated with 
initial misconfigurations are beyond the scope of this paper due to their lack of 
persistence. While some breaches can be attributed due to misconfiguration, more 
damaging attacks occur due to the efforts from an attacker that is actively exploiting 
temporary access with the goal of maintaining that access and moving laterally through 
the network. 
Although no two network intrusions are the same, many follow a similar pattern. As 
outlined in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publication 800-
                                                          
1  "2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study: Global Overview," Ponemon Institute LLC, 2018. 
[Online.] 
https://databreachcalculator.mybluemix.net/assets/2018_Global_Cost_of_a_Data_Breach_Re
port.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018] 
2 "Alteryx data breach exposed 123 million American households' information," Los Angeles 
Times, 22 December 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-alteryx-data-breach-20171222-
story.html [Accessed 19 October 2018] 
3 "Defense contractor stored intelligence data in Amazon cloud unprotected," ArsTechnica, 31 
May 2017. [Online]. Available: https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/05/defense-contractor-stored-intelligence-data-in-amazon-cloud-
unprotected/. [Accessed 19 October 2018] 
4 Dan O'Sullivan, "Black Box, Red Disk: How Top Secret NSA and Army Data Leaked Online," 
UpGuard, 28 November 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.upguard.com/breaches/cloud-
leak-inscom. [Accessed 19 October 2018] 
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115 which details the penetration testing methodology employed by government 
contractors, there are four primary stages to a penetration test: Planning, Discovery, 
Attack, and Reporting. The planning and reporting phases are beyond the scope of this 
paper as they mainly deal with the rules of engagement and follow-up to the penetration 
test. The discovery phase, also known as reconnaissance, and the attack phase involve 
the technical aspects of network intrusions where an attacker actively runs probes 
across the network to gain further access. NIST 800-115 lists four steps of the attack 
phase: gaining access, escalating privileges, system browsing, and installation of 
additional tools [1]. 
Currently, intrusion detection as a field is more art than science. Intrusion detection 
involves investigative techniques that are used to analyze possible malicious activity 
after an intrusion has already taken place. Depending on the circumstance, intrusion 
detection involves either responding to detected IOCs or, worse yet, investigation IOCs 
after initial evidence of an intrusion is found. For example, in federal information 
systems, requirements are outlined by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in multiple documents detailing the requirements for intrusion 
detection and prevention systems. Due to the many different ways that an attacker can 
gain access to a system, different system logs are monitored for any signs of abnormal 
activity. An intrusion detection system is any software that, “monitor[s] the events 
occurring in a computer system or network, analyze[s] them for signs of possible 
incidents,” while a prevention system takes additional steps to stop any incidents while 
they are occurring [2]. 
Collecting the information necessary for effective intrusion detection means data 
needs to be collected from multiple areas in the network from a variety of devices. The 
amount of logging data that is generated in a standard corporate information system can 
be staggering and working with this data can be difficult. Previous work in creating 
frameworks for intrusion detection focused on using datasets that had already 
constructed features from the original system data. This abstraction can be unrealistic 
since this feature creation is not done automatically by systems that generate these logs, 
rather done before the dataset was released to the public. We created our model to 
construct features from data that is nearly identical to what is found in system log files 
and discover and identify significant indicators of an intrusion. 
Solving the problem of identifying significant IOCs is done by following a three-
step methodology to ingest the data, create relevant features (IOCs), fit our model, and 
interpret the features on the fit of the final model. The dataset is made up of log data, 
which is not easily interpreted by a classification model. The first step is to split the 
dataset into train, validation, and test datasets thereby ensuring our trained model is 
generalizable beyond what is captured in our sample. Next, we need to create features 
from the data by identifying anomalous sequences in the logs; this requires that we 
extract specific patterns for a given source host, such as repeated failed logins, new 
DNS requests, or the number of bytes sent, all of which depend on the source of the log 
data. After feature construction, the data is preprocessed which includes normalization 
of the numbers and removing any null values.  
Step two of the methodology is modeling which is applied once all features have 
been constructed, nulls removed, and values standardized. Modeling is done by using 
a technique known as k-fold cross-validation, which is a method of improving model 
accuracy by dividing the training data into k-number of separate folds which are used 
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to reduce bias in the final trained model. Fitting of the input data to the intrusion events 
was done with four different classification models, including random forest 
classification, logistic regression, SVM, and XGBoost. Logistic regression, random 
forest classification, and SVM are well-known classification models, while XGBoost 
is a newer algorithm that has gained popularity due to its high accuracy and relative 
ease of implementation. Logistic Regression is like linear regression in that each feature 
contributes multiplier β to the dependent variable, the difference being that the 
dependent variable is transformed using a logit function, so the final value is bound 
between 0 and 1. Random forest classification is a technique that builds off decision 
trees where branching choices are made on different values of the features. Support 
vector machines (SVM) is a method of dividing the data such that a hyperplane drawn 
in an n-dimensional space (where n is the number of features) such that the hyperplane 
best separates observations with different labels. XGBoost is a variation on boosted 
decision trees that has gained much popularity due to its speed and accuracy. Accuracy 
was used as the primary metric to compare the predictive ability of the different models. 
The final step of the methodology is applying our classification model to the test set 
using the final training models and interpreting the features’ influence on the strength 
of the model. This step involves interpretation and analysis using background expertise 
to provide context to the significant IOCs. With interpreting the IOCs, we also measure 
the ability of our model to predict future attacks effectively. It is this ability to predict 
future results that demonstrates the overall effectiveness of our model. 
Through the rest of the paper, we discuss the following items. In Section 2 we review 
similar research material related to the topic in this paper. In Section 3 we review the 
general breakdown of intrusions and understand how these could present different 
signatures. Section 4 breaks down the different audit logs that make up the dataset and 
how this data is interpreted. Sections 5 through 7 break down the different steps of our 
methodology and how it is applied to our dataset. Section 5 we construct our features 
and preprocess them to ensure we are meeting the assumptions of our classification 
models. In section 6 we model the results and compare our chosen modeling techniques 
to our testing metric. Section 7 analyzes the IOCs and examines which play a more 
significant role in predicting intrusions. Section 8 covers the ethical and societal 
impacts of data collection and security breaches. In sections 9 and 10 provides the 
conclusions of our research and proposes future research topics.  
2 Literary Review 
We looked at previous research done in the field of intrusion detection and feature 
extraction. Much of the previous research was focused on the Knowledge Discover and 
Datamining (KDD) Cup 1999 dataset which is a derivative of a dataset from the 1998 
DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program [3]. There has been extensive 
research into this dataset since a significant portion of the feature construction was 
already performed on the original dataset from the DARPA program. Much of the 
preprocessing was previously done, and only analysis into the existing features was 
necessary. There has been analysis into using network theory to conduct feature 
extraction in comparison to principal component analysis (PCA), where it was found 
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there was a 1% detection rate compared to PCA, yet network theory was 13% more 
efficient [4]. Work has been done on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset using different 
classification techniques to conduct feature selection with multiple machine learning 
techniques including support vector machines (SVM), Classification and Regression 
Trees (CART) and BayesNet [3]. Additional papers implemented a combination of 
dimensionality reduction and classification to determine the best fit of machine learning 
techniques, including SVM with PCA [5], SVM with rough set kernel principal 
component analysis (RS-KPCA) [6], and neural nets with KPCA [7]. Both PCA and 
RS-KPCA are methods of dimensionality reduction that transform the input values 
using linear algebra to extract the significance of each variable has in explain the total 
variance across all variables. The fractional share that each variable has in explaining 
total variance is then used to create new variables, which is then used to train a model. 
While dimensionality reduction can create powerful models, we did not use any such 
techniques in this paper because these data transformation significantly diminish 
interpretability of the final model and make it difficult to understand which features 
have greater importance in the final model.  
Work has been done on creating frameworks to identify anomalous data in sequence 
and categorical information. Previous research has been done in identifying episodes in 
sequences and working to predict future behavior by Mannila, Toivonen, and Verkamo 
[8]. Jain, Duin, and Mao work on codifying multiple pattern recognition techniques and 
demonstrate a model for train-test split that can assist in identifying feature importance  
[9]. This research for anomaly detection was built upon by Lee, Stolfo, and Mok when 
they created their data mining framework to identify significant features in the KDD 
Cup 99 dataset [10]. We want to build on this work of framework construction and 
pattern recognition by constructing our own features from actual log data. 
3 Cyberattack Methodology 
When a computer network comes under cyber-attack, this typically is not a one-time 
event. A malefactor takes multiple steps to probe a network and discover its 
vulnerabilities. Different models exist describing the methodology used in a cyber-
attack. One model described in NIST 800-115 is a four-stage penetration methodology. 
As the name suggests, it has four stages: Planning, Discovery, Attack, and Reporting. 
The components of each stage are similar to other models.  One such model with 
similar components used to describe the different stages of a cyber-attack was 
developed by Lockheed Martin, the Cyber Kill Chain [11]. The cyber kill chain is used 
by cybersecurity teams to understand the methodology of attack from advanced 
persistent threats. The framework is used to compare the different techniques that a 
sophisticated attacker would use in trying to get to their objective. For our purposes, it 
provides a good set of steps that an attacker would follow when trying to exploit system 
access. We can use this model to describe the steps a malefactor would take to breach 
a network: 
1) Reconnaissance – This is the stage where different types of vulnerabilities are 
identified. A company’s web site is examined by scanning network ports and 
identifying services operating on various ports. Employee email addresses are obtained, 
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or other methods of identifying employees are used through professional relationships. 
2) Weaponization - This is the stage where the virus, worm or other malware is 
embedded into a payload such as a Microsoft Office document or a PDF file. The 
weapon has not been deployed at this point; it is simply prepared. 
3) Delivery - This is the stage where the malefactor delivers the weapon to the 
intended target. Any data transport mechanism could be used for this, such as email 
attachments, website downloads or even physical media such a USB thumb drive. 
4) Exploitation – In this stage some vulnerability is exploited, providing access. It 
could be as simple as a user clicking on a link in an email or running some code on a 
USB drive. “Zero day” is a term used to refer to this stage, as it is the first time some 
code is run to exploit the system.  
5) Installation – The malware or trojan is installed on a system giving the malefactor 
a backdoor entrance to the system.  This allows the adversary more or less continuous 
access to the system. 
6) Command and Control (C2) – The installed malware creates a connection 
outside the system providing some level of control of the system. This connection can 
be an external internet server or some other host system. At this point, the intruder can 
issue commands to the malware for execution. 
7) Actions on Objectives – Once command and control is established, the adversary 
can now accomplish their goal. Whether this is stealing data, deleting or modifying 
information, denying access to critical data or just using this resource to gain access to 
other network resources, the intruder has complete control of what they wanted to do. 
This is a detailed set of steps that are involved in gaining system access, and not all 
of this would be evident from our system logs. We can see from this model that there 
are many different aspects of the information system that are involved when an attacker 
is trying to gain unauthorized access and accomplish their goal. 
4 Dataset and Modeling Experiments 
Intrusion detection as a field is not new; tools have been created for decades to detect 
possible malicious activity. Software packages like Snort and Bro were traditionally 
installed at specific segments of the network to capture relevant network information 
that would indicate a possible compromise. Both Snort and Bro are open-source 
network intrusion tools that implemented static detection methods through defined rule 
sets.5 Over time these tools have become more sophisticated with improved rule sets, 
but many still rely on signatures to issue indicators of compromise. These signatures 
detect if certain phrases are in the body of the network packet, if the packet was a certain 
size, or if there is a certain number of patterns in the network traffic, such as too many 
failed logins. The effectiveness of signature-based tools is limited to how complete the 
database of signatures is, but even with an up-to-date library, a zero-day attack can 
bypass the most sophisticated signature-based system. This has led to significant 
investment in adaptive intrusion detection with an emphasis on the use of machine 
                                                          
5  "Snort, Suricata and Bro: 3 Open Source Technologies for Securing Modern Networks," 
Bricata, 2018. [Online.] https://bricata.com/blog/snort-suricata-bro-ids/ [Accessed 20 January 
2019] 
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learning. In this section, we analyze the chosen dataset and discuss how we extract 
features from each log type to detect an intrusion.  
4.1 Dataset Description 
We are using the Los Alamos Multi-Source Cyber-Security Events dataset.  This data 
set is made up of different types of computer audit logs that were recorded over the 
course of 58 days, from multiple sources that would be found in a traditional computing 
network environment. During these 58 days, an approved penetration test was 
conducted against the network with all malicious activity identified. This approved 
penetration test was conducted by a cybersecurity red team, which is a group that is 
separate from the normal cybersecurity group whose role is to test the security of the 
computer security infrastructure. Often a red team would be used to conduct tests 
against all facets of an organization's security, but for our purposes, we are only looking 
at the identified computer-based events as previously identified in the dataset. The 
events recorded during the test are used to train a model whose goal is to help future 
implementations of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) correctly identify and alert 
cybersecurity teams of possible unauthorized access to this network. The data set that 
is being used is approximately 100 gigabytes, but only a small fraction of that are the 
red team events. Dealing with this imbalance between the predicted outcome and the 
size of the complete dataset would mean that additional considerations would need to 
be taken during modeling. In small to medium environments, terabytes of auditable 
data can be generated in a single day which would need to correlate across multiple 
systems with different indicators of a possible intrusion so while this dataset is large, it 
does not compare to what many corporations have to deal with [12]. 
The data from the logs can be broken down into two parts, events that occur on the 
computers (host-based events) and events on the network (network-based events). 
Events that occur on the computers would be dependent on the type of environment, 
i.e., Windows or Linux, while network-based events should be mostly environment 
independent. In the next two parts, we cover the logs from these two groups and what 
information these logs are capturing. We also look at how abnormal activity would 
appear in each log type. The dataset was collected in four separate logs: Authentication 
logs, DNS logs, Network flow logs, and Red Team logs. The logs and the information 
tracked in them are discussed below for the major sections. The red team tracking logs 
are unique since these are used as the labels for our supervised learning. The red team 
logs are closest in format to the authentication logs since they track the authentication 
events associated with red team activity, but they do not track the same fields that are 
found in the authentication logs.  
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Table 1 - Contents of Red Team Logs 
Feature Description 
Time Time in seconds from the beginning of the recording 
period 
User & Domain Anonymized user and domain information of a 
known red team authentication request. 
Source Computer The anonymized name of the computer that is the 
source of the authentication request 
Destination Computer The anonymized name of the computer that is the 
destination of the authentication request 
4.2 Windows Event Viewer Analysis 
The built-in method of recording audit events in a Windows environment is the 
Windows event logs which track application, system, and security event information 
for later auditing. Depending on the type of log, different information is recorded 
making manual auditing of these events difficult due to formatting inconsistencies. 
Depending on the source of the auditing information this data is recorded in different 
locations. In the case of the authentication log data, this would have been recorded on 
the Domain Controller (DC) or on the local computer depending on whether the user 
was authenticating to the DC.6 The foundation of Window’s domains is built upon the 
Active Directory Service which is a technology built on Kerberos, Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol, and DNS. Kerberos provides authentication and 
authorization while Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) documents and 
categorizes the objects making up a domain.  
Understanding how Kerberos authenticates hosts on the network is critical to 
extracting features from the authentication logs. Table 2 breaks down the information 
contained in the authentication logs. 
From the authentication data, we created features based on different statuses of the 
logon event, such as failed logon. Also, we wanted to see how many people were logged 
on to a computer at a time. We expect these features to vary by time of day, so we 
processed the data to establish a baseline of use for a given time and day. 
 
                                                          
6 “Monitoring Active Directory for Signs of Compromise”, Microsoft Documents [Online.] 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-
practices/monitoring-active-directory-for-signs-of-compromise [Accessed 4 November 2018] 
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Table 2 - Contents of Authentication Logs 
Feature Description 
Time Time in seconds from the beginning of the recording 
period 
Source User & Domain The anonymized user and domain information that is 
the source of the authentication request. 
Destination User & Domain The anonymized user and domain information that is 
the destination for the authentication request 
Source Computer The anonymized name of the computer that is the 
source of the authentication request 
Destination Computer The anonymized name of the computer that is the 
destination of the authentication request 
Authentication Type Type of authentication 
Logon Type Type of Logon 
Authentication orientation Whether this is a Logon or Logoff 
Success/Failure Authentication was successful or failed 
 
In this type of log, we are interested in the abnormal event types including repeated 
failed logins, users logging into computers that they do not regularly access and 
detecting if the same account is logged on multiple times at once. While these event 
types may not be a single indicator of a breach, with traditional account auditing, such 
events would often warrant further investigation. 
Process execution and termination are recorded in event logs under the system or 
application logs. During this analysis, we conduct some sequence analysis and 
investigate whether a particular program was executed shortly before a red team event. 
Additional items of interest would be whether many events were launched or if a 
computer launched an application that it usually does not execute. The process log 
tracking this information is shown in Table 3 below. Process log data was interpreted 
using link analysis as explored by Lee, Stolfo and Mok [10]. We want to extract how 
many processes are running on a given source computer and how many new processes 
are launched on a source computer.  
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Table 3 - Contents of Process Logs 
Feature Description 
Time Time in seconds from the beginning of the 
recording period 
Source User & Domain The anonymized user name and domain of the 
source where the process exists 
Computer The anonymized computer name where the process 
exists 
Process Name The name of the process 
Start/End Defines if the process was starting or ending 
4.3 Network and DNS Configuration  
Networking infrastructure is the backbone of any corporate environment as few 
companies operate computers in isolation. Maintaining consistent network connectivity 
is essential to an information system, and the networking group often is the first group 
to be notified if there is an issue with systems communication. Outside of detecting 
intrusions, network traffic diagnostics are used for many issues like tracing traffic 
routing issues, high utilization of resources on computers, an improper configuration in 
network-based applications, and improper use of system resources. We looked at 
anomalous levels of activity from host to host using network traffic flow data. Table 4 
contains the listing of the fields in the network traffic flow audit logs. The network 
traffic data that is continuous data were added together to get the total amount sent 
during the 5-minute sample of time.  
 
Table 4 - Contents of Network Traffic Flow Logs 
Feature Description 
Time Time in seconds from the beginning of the recording 
period 
Duration Time in seconds the transaction took to occur 
Source Computer The anonymized name of the source of the network 
traffic 
Source Port The port number the source of the network traffic 
transmitted from 
Destination Computer The anonymized name of the destination of the 
network traffic 
Destination Port The anonymized port number the network traffic 
was destined 
Protocol The anonymized protocol used for data delivery 
Packet Count The number of packets transmitted in this transaction 
Byte Count The number of bytes transmitted in this transaction 
 
DNS serves multiple purposes in a Windows networked environment. DNS stands 
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for domain name system, and it provides an IP address when it is provided a hostname 
or URL. For example, when you type www.smu.edu into a web browser, the address 
129.119.70.166 is returned by your local DNS server. When you need to access a file 
or mail server on the network in a Windows environment, DNS returns the proper IP 
address of the requested resource. It is this ability to return IP addresses or logical 
addresses based on hostnames that play a fundamental role in a Windows network. 
Since Windows tracks devices by name, it needs a way to resolve how to route the 
traffic over the network.   
We want to conduct link analysis for DNS data as noted by Lee, Stolfo and Mok  
[10]. Link analysis tracks systems that are often working together, and we want to find 
patterns outside of those common links. For example, a user in the sales department 
may regularly access the file server where her tracking information is stored, but we 
want a red flag raised if she starts trying to access an application server that she has 
never used before. Table 5 lists the fields in the DNS log data file and what each field 
means. We want to look at how many DNS requests a given computer is making and 
how many new DNS requests the source computer made as features we are extracting 
from DNS.  
 
Table 5 - Contents of DNS logs 
Feature Description 
Time Time in seconds from the beginning of the recording 
period 
Source Computer The anonymized name of the computer that 
requested a DNS lookup 
Destination Computer The anonymized name of the resolved computer of 
the DNS lookup 
5 Step 1 - Feature Construction and Preprocessing 
The first step in working with this dataset is creating features from the dataset. Due to 
the event-based nature of the data, each log has a different number of events for the 
same time. We extract the relevant metric that we want to measure against our label 
that we are interested in, which are verified red team events from the red team log data. 
The data is grouped for a given timeframe (in this case we are grouping initially by 5-
minute intervals) and source computer, and then we extract the relevant metric for the 
given log. We are using a couple of different techniques depending on the type of log 
data as first described by Lee, Stolfo, and Mok [13]. Depending on the type of data we 
created features using either classification, link analysis, or sequence analysis. 
Classification is used to identify specific patterns in the logs as either binary or multi-
label results. 
For both the DNS and the process data we are using link analysis to measure two 
data points for each source computer; the number of new links not previously 
established for a given source computer and the total number of links. While it is easy 
to think of DNS traffic as being unrelated to process information, they share similar 
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characteristics when trying to model abnormal behavior. For example, with DNS traffic 
we want to know how many computers on the network the source computer is trying to 
access, and we want to see how many new computers the source computer is trying to 
reach. This same thinking also applies to computers running on a source computer. We 
wanted to see how many processes are running on a given computer along with how 
many new processes are running. Abnormal numbers could be an indication of a virus 
or other code meant to exploit the system running on the source computer.  
In the authorization dataset, we calculate the number of times that failed logons 
occurred and the number of logged on users for a given system. An increase in the 
number of failed logons could be an indication that a malicious user is trying to gain 
access to an account without knowing the correct credentials. An increase in the number 
of logged on users could be an indicator that the same account is logged on in multiple 
locations or multiple accounts are being accessed, which usually aren’t at a given time. 
Processing of the network flow data was the easiest as the original dataset was 
already in a form that represented metrics for data sent over the network. To get the 
desired values for the specific field, the sum of a metric was obtained for a given source 
computer for a 5-minute interval. For example, the packet count input column was 
summed up for a given computer for each 5-minute interval resulting in a feature 
containing the total number of packets sent by that computer.  
After all the initial features are extracted from the raw datasets, the mean values for 
each column are calculated for all source computers in each given 5-minute interval. 
This was done due to the significant computer resources that would be required to 
calculate a model for all 17,684 computers across the time frame. Rather than looking 
at a red-team event on a given source computer, we are looking for a red-team event on 
the network. Once a red-team event is identified further investigation can be done to 
determine which computer exhibits the characteristics of the uncovered red-team event.  
Once this data is aggregated, a model is taken for all data to determine the usual 
pattern for a given feature. For example, when examining the number of logged on 
users, more people would be logged on at Monday 12:00 PM than would be on at 
Monday 12:00 AM or on Sunday at 12:00 PM. We use the Facebook library prophet to 
train a model on our dataset on the usual pattern of usage day-to-day and week-to-week. 
We subtract this regular usage pattern from each feature, so we are left with only the 
outliers for a given period and feature. This final set of features is used to train our 
classification models. 
 
6 Step 2 - Modeling 
After the data is formatted consistently and the hosts are identified, we can run 
preprocessing and modeling on the data. Some data has very large ranges such as the 
network traffic feature, while features such as failed logons have a much smaller range. 
We do not want one feature having an over-weighted influence on our results, so all 
features are normalized before running through our classifier.  
Initially, we separated our data into three segments; train, validation, and test 
sections which can be seen in Figure 1. Our model is initially trained on the train data 
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to fit our classification algorithm and parameters. We then want to select our model 
from testing our model against our validation dataset. The reason this data is separate 
from our training data is that we want to generalize our model and avoid overfitting to 
our training dataset, while at the same time we want to avoid training to our test set. 
The test set should be the final test to verify that our model is fitted to the assumptions 
of our classification model and parameters. 
 
Figure 1 - Train, validation, test split of our dataset into different portion for proper validation 
and model selection. 
As part of the classification process, we used k-fold cross-validation to ensure the 
trained model is generalizable beyond the scope of this dataset. K-fold cross-validation 
is a technique of splitting our data into equal segments called folds and using 1-fold as 
a testing set while the remaining folds are used to train the model. This is done k-times 
for the input data and is done to reduce overfitting of the model on the dataset. We use 
a modified version of k-fold cross-validation known as stratified k-means. This is used 
because of the high frequency of observations where there is not an occurrence of red 
team activity. We need to oversample the times that red team activity is present in our 
predictions to ensure we have some samples of these occurrences in each fold. 
We experiment with several classification methods including logistic regression, 
Random Forest Classification, SVM, and XGBoost. We were looking for reliable 
classification methods that also gave an insightful interpretation of feature impact for 
the fitted model.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Data flow process for feature creation. 
 
Figure 2 shows a model outlining the dataflow process from feature creation to 
modeling. This model is based on the model first proposed by Jain, Duin, and Mao as 
a method of creating a system for statistical pattern recognition [9]. 
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Referencing the process in Figure 2, we are concerned with the last two steps for 
each row, the feature selection and learning portions of feature creation. This feature 
selection and training was done using a pipeline in Python allowing for modular code 
segments to be changed out for systematic retesting of machine learning models. The 
pipeline allows for multiple classifiers to be tried at once which simplifies final analysis 
as everything is saved into an easy to explore variable. We use grid search to optimize 
the training of the pipeline and to fine-tune the relevant hyperparameters of the 
classifiers. Grid search allows testing of many variations of tuning parameters in the 
pipeline to find the best fit for our data.  
Logistic Regression can be thought of as the most straightforward and easy to 
understand classifier from the group tested. Logistic regression builds off linear 
regression, where the predicted y value is limited to a value between 0 and 1 through 
the transformation using a sigmoid function. 
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a recent development in statistical analysis. 
The support vector machine attempts to classify an observation into one of two 
categories. It does this by calculating a hyperplane which separates the classes of 
observations into two classes. Depending on which side of the hyperplane an 
observation is located determines which class it is assigned.  
The techniques Random Forest Classifier and XGBoost build off of the decision tree 
model. Decision trees work to predict a label by following classification rules that 
create branches in the model. A classification rule is created by selecting a value or 
range of values of a feature or multiple features and dividing the data along that branch. 
The chosen branch can lead to a classification label (leaf) or to other branches which 
would eventually terminate in a final leaf. Decision trees are one of the most intuitive 
classification models for interpretation but can be prone to overfitting.  
Random Forest Classifier is a modification of decision tree classifiers, which creates 
multiple copies of the decision trees and averages the results between the multiple 
copies to come up with a final model that is less biased and not as prone to overfitting 
as a single tree.  
XGBoost builds off of decision trees by using a gradient boosting approach. This 
approach uses gradient descent to minimize the loss function as new models are added. 
This process continues adding new models until the loss function is minimized and no 
improvements in the model can be made. 
Selecting the optimal model involved plotting the mean test score for each round of 
model fitting with the pipeline for a given model. We grouped all the test scores by 
classification model and plotted their respective box plot. The benefit of the plots is that 
they show the total range of the given model and the median of the accuracy of the 
model. We selected XGBoost classifier as the model to use to predict for our final 
classifier since it has the highest average accuracy and the smallest range for accuracy 
scores. We wanted a model that is robust to changes in the dataset and less likely to 
provide widely varying prediction results depending on changes to the input data. 
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 Figure 3 - Boxplot model comparison of the different machine learning algorithms tested. 
In Figure 3 we showed the comparison of the accuracy of the different classifiers 
based on the training process. Due to the imbalance between the non-events to positive 
red team events we want to run further analysis to determine the effectiveness of 
identifying true positives while reducing the false negatives, known as the recall, and 
the ability to identify true positives while reducing false positives, known as precision. 
In Table 6 - Model Comparison we show the classification reports of each of the classifiers 
working on a separate validation dataset. We are testing against this new dataset to 
avoid selecting a model that is overfitted to our training data.  
From the entries for SVM and Logistic Regression we see that even if zero true 
positives are predicted the model would have a 96.7% accuracy. Based on these results 
neither SVM of Logistic Regression are valid models since they have a zero for both 
precision and recall.  
Table 6 - Model Comparison 
Model Comparison Classification Report 
Classification Model Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score 
SVM 96.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Logistic Regression 96.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Random Forest Classifier 96.6% 55.0% 5.0% 10.0% 
XGBoost 96.7% 46.0% 15.0% 23.0% 
 
For a final comparison, we plotted the ROC curves for our four models using the 
validation dataset in Figure 4. The ROC curve gives a visual representation of the model 
classification report where it plots the relationship of each model’s sensitivity (true 
positive rate) against its specificity (true negative rate). These plots help to reinforce 
15
Millett et al.: Creating Indicators of Compromise for Intrusion Detection
Published by SMU Scholar, 2019
the decision to use XGBoost as the optimal classifier for our final model.  
Figure 4 - ROC curve model comparison shows the performance of the different algorithms to 
reduce false positives and optimize true positives. 
 
Figure 5 - Initial confusion matrix without optimization for our decision threshold. 
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In Figure 5 we present the confusion matrix for the XGBoost model. The confusion 
matrix is read as follows; the bottom right of the matrix shows how many times we 
predicted a red team event when one actually happened (12). The top left of the matrix 
shows how many times we predicted the lack of a red team event when no event 
happened (1597). Each of these events is showing how often we correctly predicted the 
true state and make up or accuracy score. The top right quadrant shows how many times 
there was not a red team event, but we predicted one had occurred (13). These are also 
known as Type I errors. The bottom left of the matrix shows how many times a red 
team event did occur, but we failed to predict it (42). This is also a Type II error. When 
predicting network intrusions, we want to be as accurate as possible, but we also need 
to limit the number of Type II errors. This situation means an intrusion occurred, but 
we failed to predict it. We need to raise the Recall score to do this. Ideally, we would 
also raise the Precision score which is measuring how often we predicted an intrusion 
when in fact none occurred. However, raising the Recall score is more important as we 
want to limit the number of intrusions we miss.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Recall and precision curves show the optimal threshold where our recall and 
precision curves intersect. 
 
Modifying the threshold hyper-parameter of the model results in the chart seen in 
Figure 6. this helps identify the best threshold for our model. We re-ran the model with 
the updated parameters and threshold set at 17%. The result is seen in the confusion 
matrix depicted in Figure 7. This updated model is doing a slightly better job at 
predicting when a red team event occurred (17), a true positive event. The other result 
is we have fewer false negative predictions (37), meaning we aren't incorrectly 
predicting a non-event when in fact a red team event has occurred. We have reduced 
our Type II error at the expense of increasing Type I errors. 
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Table 7 Recall Scores of Test Dataset 
Recall score comparison of the test dataset 
Threshold setting Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score 
Initial setting @ 50% 98.5% 48.0% 22.2% 30.2% 
Optimized setting @ 17% 95.5% 31.5% 31.5% 31.5% 
 
Table 7 shows the increase in the Recall score. A side effect of this increase has 
resulted in a slightly lower overall Accuracy score and a lower Precision score. The 
changes in these scores are acceptable trade-offs to get the increase Recall score. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Final confusion matrix showing the false positives and false negatives when our 
threshold is optimized. 
7 Step 3 - Measuring Importance of IOCs 
The final step for creating our model was comparing the relative weight of the features 
for each classification model and the relative score of each model. Now that we have a 
model that is fit to the data we extracted the individual importance of each feature to 
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predicting likely red team events. In Figure 8 we see the relative importance that each 
feature has in the final model. The top two events are related to new processes and DNS 
requests made by compromised computers. This would be expected as a new activity 
that is outside of the normal operation for the user. The next two features, logged on 
and failed count, are associated with authentication events and the last of the top five 
significant IOCs are higher than usual DNS queries.  
The top 5 events can be broken up into three major categories, greater than usual 
new process and traffic activity, increased user activity, and increased network traffic. 
The next four important features beyond the top five are all associated with increased 
network traffic. So additional user activity that is outside of the normal activity would 
be an indicator of compromise.   
 
Figure 8 - Feature importance of the final model chosen from our machine learning model. 
8 Ethical and Societal Impact 
There can be significant impacts on individuals and companies should they fall victim 
to their data being compromised due to a security breach. As a result, governments are 
enacting legislation to ensure there are penalties for companies that do not take proper 
precautions in securing private data in addition to giving people greater control over 
their data. Penalties are centered around the lack of proper controls and mandating 
companies to reveal when a breach has occurred. To enforce new regulations 
companies are having to take great steps to capture and monitor user and employee data 
on their networks. This desire for individual privacy and required corporate security 
means that companies need to take care when implementing information security 
policies. We discuss the implications of these laws on big data, information security, 
and the impact on people. 
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8.1 Ethical and Privacy Implications of Corporate Data Collection 
The right to privacy has been documented going back as far as an article in the Harvard 
Law Review by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890 where they stated 
“Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be 
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual […] the right 
‘to be let alone’ [14]”. Going as far back as the referenced Harvard Law Review article 
we have an expectation of privacy, which is now extended to all aspects of our lives 
including our online presence. However, this expectation of privacy is different when 
people are at home versus when they are at work. In the home and on personal 
computing devices, people may believe their data is not being snooped, but this 
viewpoint changes in the workplace. The majority of employees do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace; rather, there is the expectation they 
would be given notice they are being monitored [15]. There is extensive case law siding 
with employers on the topic of employee privacy. Even though employees may 
understand their internet usage is being monitored in the workplace, and it is legal to 
do so, one study by Thomson Reuters/FindLaw.com found half of adult Americans 
admit to using the Internet for personal use while at work.7 This finding leads us to 
believe people are not very concerned about the monitoring of their personal data and 
hence have some level of trust that their employer has a strong enough ethical approach 
when it comes to capturing but not using this data in a malicious manner. The back and 
forth tug between employers and employees over privacy is nothing new.  
Corporations are capturing enormous amounts of data. A study by Domo Inc -  
Data Never Sleeps 5.0, estimate 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are created every day.8 
The data captured by corporations can be divided into two different types; data 
collected internally from work being done by employees, and data collected on 
individuals who interact with the company, possibly as customers or in some other non-
compensated manner. Corporations must have people and processes in place to deal 
with both types of data collected. 
Corporations collect and keep data regarding vital statistics about their employees. 
Therefore, preventing network intrusions becomes a case of protecting employees' 
personal data.  When a person is first hired for a job, much of their personal 
information is captured by the employer including sensitive information such as 
address, social security number, and phone number. If the employer provides health 
insurance, then they may collect information such as marital status, names and number 
of children in the employee’s family and perhaps drug screening information. In the 
United States, information collected by an employer regarding their medical history 
must be kept confidential per the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Genetic 
                                                          
7 "Half of Americans Use the Internet for Personal Reasons While at Work," 23 November 2015. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/press-
releases/2015/november/americans-use-internet-personal-reasons-at-work-findlaw-
survey.html. [Accessed 27 October 2018]. 
8  "Data Never Sleeps 5.0," Domo Inc, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.domo.com/learn/data-never-sleeps-5?aid=ogsm072517_1&sf100871281=1. 
[Accessed 4 November 2018] 
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Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).  
Aside from this medical and disability information, companies have minimal legal 
obligations to protect employee data. Employees implicitly trust that their employer 
would keep personal data confidential. Examples like the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) data breach show the extent to which personal information can be 
released when due care is not taken in securing network infrastructure. In the case of 
the OPM breach, the records of 21.5 million current and former federal employees and 
contractors were exfiltrated.9 People that were impacted by this breach had information 
from their SF-86 compromised, which includes previous employers, criminal history, 
family relationships, foreign contacts, and mental health history.10,11   
8.2 Societal Impacts of Network Intrusions 
The societal impact of network breaches is being felt as people lose control of their 
data. What is less evident is the ethical struggle that many companies are dealing with 
in disclosing that a breach occurred. It is not always in a company’s best interest to 
disclose that a breach has occurred. That is why all 50 states including the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enacted some form of 
legislation requiring entities to notify individuals of security breaches where personally 
identifiable information is concerned12. Some industries have had this obligation to 
report breaches in a set amount of time, as is the case of healthcare providers with the 
HITECH Act [16], while other companies are under no such obligation. According to 
the Identity Theft Resource Center, in 2017, there were 1579 publicly disclosed 
breaches [17]. A different study done in 2018 by the Ponemon Institute found, on 
average, it takes organizations 197 days to even identify when a data breach has 
occurred and another 69 days to contain the breach  [18].13 Personal information can 
be stolen and used before anyone realizes the breach has occurred. The improper 
exposure of any of these pieces of data can cause personal harm. Most of the time 
hackers are attempting to find some way to achieve financial gain from stealing data or 
                                                          
9 “Millions more Americans hit by government data hack.” Reuters, 9 July 2015 [Online]. 
Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-usa/millions-more-americans-
hit-by-government-personnel-data-hack-idUSKCN0PJ2M420150709 [Accessed 4 November 
2018] 
10 “OPM Hack Far Deeper Than Publicly Acknowledged, Went Undetected For More Than A 
Year, Sources Say”, ABC News, 11 June 2015 [Online]. Available: 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/opm-hack-deeper-publicly-acknowledged-undetected-year-
sources/story?id=31689059 [Accessed 4 November 2018]  
11  “Questionnaire for National Security Positions”, OPM, 2010 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdf_fill/sf86-non508.pdf [Accessed 4 November 2018] 
12 "Security Breach Notification Laws," National Conference of State Legislatures, 29 Sept 
2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx. 
13"2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study: Global Overview," Ponemon Institute LLC, 2018. [Online.] 
https://databreachcalculator.mybluemix.net/assets/2018_Global_Cost_of_a_Data_Breach_Re
port.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018]  
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breaking into systems. We look at an example of these three types of breaches and the 
negative results and large numbers of people. 
As corporations take additional steps to prevent or catch malicious activity against 
the organization, many costs are imposed on employees and the customers of the 
organization. Security controls are being imposed in many organizations, increasing the 
cost of doing business due to additional technology investments. The task of preventing 
intrusions becomes part of the employee’s responsibility, heaping more administrative 
burden onto the workforce. Although this cost is shared by a number of people, many 
companies are still experiencing breaches in their security with varying impact on their 
business. While the cost to the business of implementing effective security controls can 
be significant, more penalties are being levied against companies that fail to protect 
against a data breach. With laws like HIPAA/HITECH, there are additional costs to 
bring a business' data standards up to the necessary level to ensure they are complying. 
Even though there can be benefits in updating the infrastructure to support the systems 
that comply with HITECH, i.e., electronic health records systems, the imposition of 
these requirements can take away from health care professionals providing adequate 
care instead of working toward maintaining compliance [19]. The goal is not to reduce 
positive outcomes with data protection; rather it is promoting an environment where 
adverse outcomes are less likely.  
Personal health information has become a favorite target of hackers. Over the last 
10 years, more and more health records have become electronic health records. The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 incentivized medical professionals 
to adopt electronic health records.14 This increase in availability means there is more 
opportunity for data breaches of health records. Since October of 2009, the number of 
individuals affected by stolen health records is a staggering 173,398,820 occurring 
across 1863 different breaches [20]. According to the "Health Warning” report by the 
Intel Security McAfee Labs, cybercriminals are putting more time and resources into 
exploiting and monetizing health care data.15 It is clear that this type of data breach is 
a growing problem. Blackmail and extortion are the types of crimes that may go 
unreported. The reason for the extortion may be compromising information that 
individuals do not want to report to authorities. If criminals are successful in 
perpetrating this type of crime, then we can expect health records to continue to be a 
target of hackers as they find ways to monetize this data on the black market. 
9 Conclusions 
Our primary task was constructing features from a standard dataset made up of log data 
and identifying features that may be indicators of compromise which best detect 
                                                          
14 “Medicare and Medicaid Health Information Technology: Title IV of the American Recovery 
And Reinvestment Act,” 16 June 2009. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2009-Fact-sheets-
items/2009-06-16.html. [Accessed 06 October 2018]. 
15 "Why data security is the biggest concern for health care," UIC Health Informatics, 2017. 
[Online.] https://healthinformatics.uic.edu/resources/articles/why-data-security-is-the-
biggest-concern-of-health-care/ [Accessed 4 November 2018] 
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network intrusions. Using pre-planned controlled network intrusions to create red team 
logs is an effective method to analyze network behavior in an effort to identify specific 
indicators of compromise. Exploratory data analysis identified areas where features 
were created from raw data to come up with a model that was able to identify when IT 
professionals should examine network logs more closely for an intrusion. The features 
that we found that the top five indicators of compromise could be lumped into three 
major groups, new unique traffic, authentication events, and DNS queries. Using this 
methodology for identifying IOCs we were able to identify the constructed indicators 
that best predicted that an intrusion event happened.  
While it is difficult to quantify the improvement, our model made on our initial 
requirements of this project, the framework used can be scaled up to accommodate the 
dataset and future development. While most IDS developers do not publish their 
response rates because the effectiveness will depend on the ruleset used, this model 
could be easily applied to work in an existing infrastructure to create additional layers 
of an existing security stance. Overtime with additional development the model used in 
this paper could provide better insight into the tools already used by a team to improve 
a group’s chances of catching an intrusion. 
10 Future Work 
Our model provided some success in identifying data breaches given a training model 
on this particular type of network. This model should be tested against other data with 
similar logs to see if we attain similar performance. Our testing of classification 
algorithms was not exhaustive. Future work should include using other algorithms to 
see if better performance can be attained. Additional work would need to be in three 
primary areas, limitations with our ability to process that amount of data in the dataset, 
the ability to create dynamic features easily from the dataset, and the ability to remove 
periodicity from the created features.  
Improved methods for finding outliers in the timeseries data would help for the 
classifiers identify significant features in the final model. Partially the issue was the 
lack of a suitable period to create a baseline for normal use, and the other is the chosen 
library used to identify outliers in the data. While the Prophet library is good at fitting 
a normalized model to the data, it also introduced unwanted periodicity into some 
features like data that was extracted from the DNS logs. Ideally, an improved algorithm 
would be used to train on a baseline period and then used to identify outliers in the data 
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